We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD countries. Results indicate that governments typically transfer ownership rights without relinquishing proportional control. Control is commonly retained by leveraging state investments through pyramids, dualclass shares, and golden shares. Indeed, at the end of 2000, after the largest privatization wave in history, governments retain control of 62.4% of privatized firms. In civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, whereas in common law countries they typically use golden shares. However, when we combine these two mechanisms, we find no association between a country's legal tradition and the extent of government control. Rather, we document more prevalent government influence over privatized firms in countries with proportional electoral rules and with a centralized system of political authority.
I. Introduction
The wave of privatizations that began in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, and spread across the globe during the 1990s, produced what is arguably the greatest transfer of ownership in the history of the corporation. Governments all over the world have sold, or are selling, large blocks of their ownership positions to the private sector. In terms of flows, privatization transactions, including share issue privatization (SIP) and private placements, raised US$1,230 billion globally during the 19772003 period, about one fifth of the total value of issues floated on public equity markets. Yet stories in the popular press suggest that the rollback of state control has been incomplete. Governments have often separated ownership and control in privatized companies by means of devices that leverage the voting power associated with their investments, such as pyramids, and by means of special powers, such as the power to veto acquisitions, granted to the state. 1 The tendency for states to retain control after privatization is illustrated by the Italian government's power in its stateowned enterprises (SOEs). The Italian government launched its first large scale privatization program after the 1992 general elections, when the country was facing one of the most acute economic and political crises of the postwar period. Since 1993, major privatization deals have raised more than US$100 billion, making Italy third in total value of privatizations worldwide (Securities Data Corporation). Despite this apparently remarkable result, the Italian government is still an influential shareholder in many privatized firms. For example it holds direct and indirect stakes, through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, in Eni (the largest oil and gas company), Enel (the electricity giant), Alitalia (the flagship carrier), and Finmeccanica (the aerospace, defense and IT group). It also can veto strategic decisions and acquisitions in fully privatized companies such as Telecom Italia, the former state telecommunication monopoly. These preliminary observations suggest that, despite the large value of total privatizations, some governments retain substantial power in SOEs.
In this paper, we evaluate whether government control of privatized companies is significant, and how widespread this control is. We also analyze country, industry, and firm attributes that tend to be associated with government influence over privatized firms.
We show that many privatizations are characterized by the sale of equity without a proportional transfer of control. There are two types of mechanism that are commonly used to achieve this. First, the government can leverage the voting power associated with its investment through pyramiding, dual class shares, etc. With these ownership leveraging devices, it can remain the largest ultimate shareholder of a company even though it no longer directly owns 100% of the stock. Second, it may hold golden shares, permitting the government to make important decisions in the company, such as to veto proposed acquisitions, or alternatively, to impose constraints on other investors, such as caps on their share of voting rights. 2 We document the government's overall control in privatized firms by evaluating both ultimate control and golden shares.
For our analysis, we construct a sample of 141 companies from developed economies that were privatized (and became publicly traded) prior to the end of 1996. Just considering ultimate government voting rights, we find that the most common privatization outcome is that the state remains the largest ultimate owner. This is true for about one third of socalled "privatized" firms.
The notion of ultimate control is relatively new. A few studies employ this concept in settings unrelated to privatization; these studies report the widespread presence of governments as ultimate owners of banks (La Porta, LopezdeSilanes and Shleifer, 2002) , and as owners of a wider range of firms (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999 , Claessens et al., 2000 , and Faccio and Lang, 2002 . To our knowledge, however, with the exception of Tian's (2000) study of Chinese privatizations, all other analyses of privatizations have taken only direct ownership into account.
2 See Section III.B for a more precise definition of golden shares.
In a recent paper, Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2005) study direct ownership and conclude that governments relinquish control over time. We show that the picture looks totally different when ownership leveraging devices are accounted for. Thus, had we not considered these mechanisms, we would have substantially understated the power of the state in privatized firms. 3 Consistent with earlier findings by Jones, Megginson, Netter and Nash (1999) , our results indicate widespread use of golden shares. Additionally, we show that golden shares are particularly common amongst privatized companies in which the government is not the largest shareholder. This combination of evidence allows us to conclude that through either direct ownership, or leveraging devices or golden shares, governments maintain control of almost two thirds of privatized firms. This result is quite surprising, given the conventional wisdom that the massive privatization wave of the 1990s was spurred by a drastic rethinking of the role of state ownership.
Interestingly, we show that the devices favored for retaining government control differ somewhat across countries. In common law countries, governments tend to retain control by using golden shares, and they are unlikely to retain large ownership positions, whereas in civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions. When we look at the combined effect of ultimate ownership and golden shares, we find no relation between the percentage of privatized firms in which the government has significant overall control and a country's legal tradition. The evidence indicates that governments tend to retain control through ownership in countries dominated by left wing majorities; in democracies with proportional electoral systems; and in countries with centralized fiscal authority. Results also indicate that some of these factors are significantly related to the frequency with which governments retain overall control of privatized firms. We conclude that in the more politically fragmented environments, privatization tends to be incomplete. On the contrary, the delegation of substantial authority to subnational governments fosters full privatization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the sample and data employed in the study. In section III, we discuss the structure of control in privatized and matching firms. Section IV presents our analysis of the relation between the use of the two control mechanisms, ultimate voting rights and golden shares, and various characteristics associated with countries, industries, and firms. Section V summarizes the conclusions to be drawn from our study.
II. Data
A. The samples of privatized and control companies
The Global New Issues Database of Securities Data Corporation (SDC) provided the complete list of privatization transactions in public equity markets in OECD economies before 1/1/1997. Privatization transactions are defined as primary or secondary issues of shares on public equity markets, by companies in which central or local governments are shareholders. We retrieve 299 privatization transactions, 44% of which are IPOs from the SDC database. It has been widely documented that the large size of SOEs has often forced divesting governments to offer a series of tranches. In fact, the privatizations reported by SDC include 205 companies, each of which offered an average of 1.4 issues. We cross checked our privatization sample with information from various sources. All the companies in our list are also reported in the Privatization International (PI) dataset and appear in Megginson's Appendix. 4 We also compare the SDC data with information from selected official sources, such as the Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the British HM Treasury, and Spanish SEPI, and other privatization agencies. Using data from these other sources, we conclude that our initial sample includes 98% of companies privatized in the public equity markets in OECD countries prior to 1997. (1996) . Among all eligible firms, we select the one with the equity market capitalization closest to that of the privatized firm, at year end 1996, as long as its market capitalization is within a +/30% range. If no company satisfies these criteria, we ignore the country criterion, and select a firm and in the same Campbell industry classification that has the closest market capitalization and is within the +/30% range. If no match is found, we ignore the industry criterion, we then pick the domestic firm with the closest market capitalization that is within the +/30% at the end of 1996. If the government is a shareholder of a matching firm, we replace it with the next size match. The first step criteria yield matches for 68% of privatized firms; the second step criteria yield matches for 30%, and only one match required use of the third criteria.
Name changes and acquisitions are tracked using the information contained in Worldscope, Extel and SDC. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, we track the bidding company or the company resulting from the merger. In some cases, a privatized company merged with or was acquired by a privately held company and was either delisted or its shares were registered under a new name. We track the newly created company, provided that its shares trade on the stock market where shares of the privatized company were was initially floated.
B. Control structure: Data and examples
We employ the sources listed in the Appendix to measure the ultimate control (voting) rights of the largest shareholders for all privatized and matching companies. Ultimate voting rights are measured at the end of 1996 and 2000, following the procedure employed in previous studies by La Porta, LopezdeSilanes, and Shleifer (1999) , Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) , and Faccio and Lang (2002 Crossholdings: The largest ultimate owner of Firm X is another firm, Y, of which the largest owner is, in turn, firm X, or alternatively, firm X is the largest direct owner of its own stock.
If the largest ultimate owner of a corporation is an unlisted firm, we trace its owners using all available data sources. Companies that do not have a shareholder controlling at least 10% of votes are classified as widely held.
[ Table I goes here] The ownership of matching firms exhibits a different pattern (see Table I , Panel B). By construction, the government is never the largest shareholder in the matching sample. Most frequently, matching companies are widely held (37.59% of firms in 1996 and 41.84% in 2000).
Second most frequently, the largest shareholder of matching firms is a family; they constitute 35.46% of largest owners in 1996, and 28.37% in 2000. The largest owner is also frequently a widely held financial institution (19.86% of matching firms in 1996, and 11.35% in 2000).
Widely held corporations, miscellaneous investors, and crossholdings play a minor role.
A comparison of privatized and matching firms (Panel C) shows some convergence in their control structures. From 1996 to 2000, the differences in the percentage of firms with families as the largest shareholder, widely held financial institutions and miscellaneous shareholders declined or became insignificant. However, the differences in the percentage of firms with widely held corporations as the largest shareholder, as well as the differences in the percentage of widely held firms, increase.
[ Table II goes here] 
B. Golden shares
The government can grant itself wide discretionary powers over even fully privatized firms.
We define golden share as the set of the State's special powers and statutory constraints on privatized companies. Typically, special powers include (i) the right to appoint members in corporate boards; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant interests in the privatized companies; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, ordinary management, etc. The above mentioned rights may be temporary or not. On the other hand, statutory constraints include (i) ownership limits; (ii) voting caps; (iii) national control provisions.
Golden shares have different institutional characteristics in different countries. For example, in many firms in the U.K., the special shareholder must give prior consent to changes in the ownership caps in the articles of association, which usually prevent any investor or group of investors from holding 15% or more of the firm's voting rights. Further, in the UK, the articles defining rights attached to the special share cannot be altered or removed. The special shares do not permit the state to vote at general meetings, but they do entitle the holder to attend and speak at such meetings. This set of basic special share provisions are present in the articles of association of British Aerospace (now BAE Systems), British Energy, Southern Electric and National Grid Group Plc. The rights attached to the special share are wider in only a few cases, in which a national strategic interest can be identified. The French action spécifique gives the state extensive powers. In general, the relevant Minister's prior approval is required for any investor to hold more than a certain percentage of the capital or voting rights (10% for Elf Aquitaine (now Total), Havas and ThomsonCSF (now Thales)). Usually a representative of the French government is appointed to the board of directors to act on behalf of the Minister. In some cases he has specific veto powers (e.g., for Elf Aquitaine, to block the sale of certain strategic assets), while in others he can veto any board resolution (ThomsonCSF). In Turkey, in some cases, special powers are so extensive that they involve the government in everyday management.
We collected prospectuses for our firms, because information regarding golden share provisions must be fully disclosed in the prospectuses of listed companies. The prospectuses were provided by the individual companies themselves, investment banks, security exchange commissions, and privatization agencies. We obtained prospectuses for, and identified the presence or absence of golden shares in 104 of the 141 companies in our sample of privatized firms.
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[ Table III goes here] Table III documents the distribution of golden shares amongst privatized firms. We find that 62.5% of these firms have outstanding golden shares at the end of 1996. Special powers are quite common, occurring in 39.42% of privatized companies. In a number of cases, privatized companies' charter provisions set upper limits on the ownership or voting rights that can be 7 Detailed institutional information about golden shares can be found on various official web sites such as: the HM Treasury in the United Kingdom, www.hmtreasury.gov.uk; the Spanish Sociedad Estatal de acquired by other investors without government approval. In some cases, these limitations apply only to foreign investors. It is common for articles of incorporation to require that the headquarters be located in the country of incorporation or to require that the board members be citizens of the country of incorporation.
Golden shares are less common amongst companies in which the government is the largest ultimate shareholder. As reported in Table III, at Participaciones Industriales, www.sepi.es; and the Austrian Holding and Privatisation Agency, www.oiag.at. 8 In computing these percentages, we make the conservative assumption that companies for which we could not obtain the privatization prospectus do not have golden shares. Additionally, golden shares exist in more than half of the firms operating in the following sectors:
basic industries, consumer durables, leisure, petroleum, transportation, and utilities. On the other hand, golden shares are relatively uncommon in the capital goods, finance/real estate, and textiles/trade sectors.
[ Table IV goes here]
Panel B of Table IV shows the variation in government control of privatized firms by country. At the end of 2000, the government was still the largest shareholder in all former SOEs in Finland and Greece. On the other hand, the privatization process appears to have been more complete in Australia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Turkey, the UK, and the US. These figures, however, reflect only the identity of the largest blockholder, and they reveal nothing about golden shares. In fact, all firms have outstanding golden shares in Australia, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Turkey. In the UK, although the government held less than 10% of voting rights in all privatized firms, it held golden shares in 85% of privatized companies.
Panel C shows the effect of four country characteristics on the extent of government control of privatized companies. The first characteristic is the legal tradition of the firm's country. Past research has shown that in civil law countries, the state is typically a more influential blockholder than it is in common law countries (La Porta, LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer, 1999) . Researchers have observed that large government ownership positions in banks are pervasive in civil law countries (La Porta, LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer, 2002) . Legal tradition also affects investor protection and financial development, and thus it may affect indirectly the government's incentives to relinquish control of SOEs (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 . We test the role of legal tradition by identifying countries with a Common Law tradition.
Our results are consistent with prior evidence regarding the effect of legal tradition on voting rights (La Porta, LopezdeSilanes, and Shleifer (1999, 2002) ). Governments are substantially more likely to be the largest blockholder in civil law, as opposed to common law, countries: 48.5% of firms in civil law countries compared to 4.6% in common law countries.
However, we find the opposite result for golden shares. In common law countries, 86.5% of firms have outstanding golden shares, compared to only 49.2% of companies in civil law countries.
Governments in common law countries are clearly using alternative instruments to retain influence. This suggests that earlier studies overstate the difference between firms in countries with the two legal traditions.
We also consider two political characteristics that may affect government control of privatized firms: the political incentives shaped by electoral rules, and whether the incumbent government is oriented to the right or left of the political spectrum. A higher electoral disproportionality is a key feature of majoritarian political systems, displaying on average a lower number of parties, more stable cabinets, and a lower degree of political fragmentation (Persson and Tabellini, 2003) . Previous research has established that majoritarian countries privatize sooner a larger fraction of their SOE sector. On the contrary, in proportional political systems privatization is delayed by the conflict among the several parties with veto power Pinotti, 2003, and Siniscalco, 2004 ). Thus electoral disproportionality should affect residual state ownership in privatized firms. Our index Dispr is the Gallagher (1991) index of disproportionality: Results reported in Panel C show that the level of electoral disproportionality is related to the likelihood that governments remain the largest shareholder after privatization. Specifically, we find a significantly higher proportion of firms in which the government is the largest shareholder in countries with a low disproportionality index.
Several theoretical models have shown that partisan politics is relevant to privatization (Perotti, 1995; Biais and Perotti, 2002) . In particular, these models show that by allocating a substantial amount of (underpriced) equity to the middle class, right wing governments create a constituency that supports market oriented policies, which in turn, increases their chances of reelection. The empirical implication of this outcome is straightforward: one would expect more government control of privatized firms in countries ruled by socialist or Christiandemocrat coalitions relative to countries governed by rightwing, market oriented cabinets.
Using Huber's and Inglehart's (1995) comprehensive partisan classification as a starting point, we construct an index of political orientation Partisan. Our index is computed as the weighted average of the rightleft political orientation scores of the parties forming the executive branch of government, where the weights are the ratio of the number of parliamentary seats held by each party to the total held by the ruling coalition as a whole as a proxy of the effective power enjoyed by each party within the government coalition. The partisan data are counted immediately after the last election. The leftright political orientation score is high (low) for right wing (leftwing) parties. This index survived extensive crosschecking with other independent sources. We expect that when our index is used to explain the timing of privatization in OECD countries, large scale privatization will occur later (be more incomplete at any given time) in countries ruled by coalitions that lean to the left of the political spectrum (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003) . Consistent with our predictions, we find more government control of privatized firms in countries ruled by leftwing governments (e.g., low partisan index).
According to the commitment view, governments are forced to establish SOEs when they lack the necessary institutions to support private investment in sociallyvaluable projects due to the risk of expropriation (see Esfahani and Ardakani, 2005 Before proceeding with the analysis, additional data was collected. First, we must have the data required track changes in governments' direct and indirect ownership in our privatized firms.
Changes in direct ownership may be due to additional sales of stock to other investors, to primary stock issues, or to acquisitions of the company's shares by the government or other public entities.
When governments use pyramiding in their control positions, changes in the control structure must be identified along the entire chain. This additional data allows us to construct the variable State voting rights, percentage ultimate voting rights held by the government in the privatized company, for each year in the 19962000 period. Second, we collect data to construct a set of economic and financial variables to control for firmspecific time varying effects.
Our test includes three regression models. First, we estimate State voting rights. Second, we estimate the probability of observing golden shares. We use a dummy variable Golden, which equals 1 if at least one of the provisions that we described in our discussion of golden shares (section III.B) is present in firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we evaluate the combination of power held by governments through voting rights and golden shares by estimating the probability that the government is the largest shareholder and/or that the firm has golden share provisions. This probability is captured by two dummy variables, GoldOwn10 and GoldOwn20, which equal 1 when Golden is equal to one and/or when residual government voting rights exceed 10 or 20 percent, respectively, and which equal 0 otherwise. We now turn to the explanatory variables.
A. Country specific explanatory variables
We consider a variety of country characteristics, including legal, institutional, political, and economic conditions that may affect the level of governmental power in privatized firms. In all regressions, we control for the legal tradition of the country, the degree of electoral disproportionality, the partisan orientation of the government, and the level of political decentralization. These variables were described in Section III.C.
In addition, we consider a variable related to the country's financial situation. Indeed, financially distressed governments have frequently divested their SOEs and have used the sale proceeds to reduce public debt or to help finance the budget. Furthermore, in some developed countries, notably in Italy and France, bailouts of SOEs have been a drain on the government's budget. In this situation, privatization might improve the public budget directly by reducing government transfers to these companies. Our measure of a government's financial condition is the ratio of total government debt (domestic and foreign) to GDP in a given year (Debt Ratio).
Fiscal deficits could be used an alternative measure, but it seems more suitable to use a stock variable, rather than a flow variable, to explain our dependent variables. Furthermore, debt series are typically more stable over business cycles.
B. Firm specific explanatory variables
We control for several firm characteristics that potentially affect government voting rights after privatization. First, we consider whether the firm is in a politically sensitive industry. Some privatized firms in the energy, transportation, telecommunication, and utility industries are strategically important for the national economy, and they are often shielded from competition.
Furthermore, they may enjoy favourable treatment by the state with respect to regulation, guaranteed business, contracts, etc. If companies operating in these sectors are more important to the state, it is plausible that the government will keep a larger stake in these firms. Governments may also derive significant benefits from ownership of banks, which can be used to control the selection of projects to be financed. We control for this effect with industry dummy variables, based on twodigit SIC codes, for more politically sensitive sectors (Petroleum, Transportation,
Utilities, Finance).
We also control for the firm's value, profitability, size and leverage; financial data for these variables was collected from Worldscope. These variables are tested using two variable types: the variable levels for a privatized firm and the differences between the privatized firm and its matching peer. In the first case, we assume that the government decision to retain control depends on the characteristics of the privatized company. In the second case, we assume that the government decision depends on the relative performance of the privatized firm compared to its benchmark firm. Since these two types of variables are labelled with the same names, the types are explicitly specified in the notes to the tables and in the discussions. We use standard variables for these firm characteristics; we measure value with markettobook (MB), profitability with return on equity (ROE), size with the (log of) total assets (Size), and leverage with the debtto equity ratio (Leverage).
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Government residual voting rights may also depend on the nonpecuniary private benefits of control. Since they reflect the benefits a shareholder may extract from the firm, they should be correlated with the firm's control structure. In particular, we expect to should observe a higher subsequent concentration of government control in industries in which shareholders are able to extract larger nonpecuniary benefits. The problem is, of course, to find a way of isolating non pecuniary benefits. For this purpose, we follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2006) (Amemiya, 1985) . Additionally, the probabilities of control via golden shares are estimated using conventional Probit models. All the econometric models presented estimate the parameters by maximizing a loglikelihood function.
Our dataset makes it possible to use panel estimation techniques, which deal both with the heterogeneity over time and across units (i.e. firms, in our case). Equations have been estimated by using random effects models.
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We are also aware that our estimates may be affected by endogeneity problems, especially when firm characteristics are included as regressors. As a partial solution, all the time varying covariates are lagged one year. Obviously, the lagged variables are predetermined but not strictly year end exchange rate. Leverage is computed as (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt + Current Portion of Long Term Debt) / Common Equity. 11 Our variable is slightly different from the one used in Gompers et al. (2006) . Our changes are driven mostly by data constraints. 12 It is well known that fixed effects nonlinear models produce inconsistent estimates, and that inconsistency is particularly severe for the probit model (Greene, 2004) . The problem is that the estimator of each fixed effect uses only information from the corresponding group and the alternative of sweeping out intercepts by taking withingroup averages is not possible in nonlinear models. When a small number of observations is available for each group (as it happens in our sample) the variance of the estimator of the fixed effect does not asymptotically converge to 0; as a consequence, the estimator of the slope coefficient is also biased.
exogenous. Thus, we are estimating conditional expectations, and we caution the reader not to infer causality when interpreting our reported coefficients.
D. Empirical results
We do not have a theoretical basis for predicting a different effect of any of our explanatory variables on ultimate government voting rights or on golden shares provisions. No clear relation is visible between these two channels, even though some provisions (particularly special powers, ownership limits and voting caps imposed on foreign shareholders) appear to be negatively correlated with ultimate government voting rights. For the sake of consistency, we run exactly the same models for all dependent variables described at the beginning of section IV. (3) and (4) include both the sector dummies and firm specific characteristics. The model in Column (3) uses the variable levels for the privatized firms' levels and the model in Column (4) uses the differences between the privatized company and its peer.
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[ Table V goes here]
The results reported in Table V confirm that our legal, institutional and political factors are relevant in explaining government control in privatized firms. Consistent with previously reported results, privatized firms in common law countries have a lower level of government voting rights than those in civil law countries; the difference is significant at the .01 level. Thus, in terms of voting rights, privatization is more complete in common law countries. A result that is perhaps more surprising is that fiscal federalism has a considerable effect on the extent of privatization. Across all specifications, the dummy Federal is always negative and highly statistically significant. It is important to note that this effect holds for all privatized firms, not just for those controlled by a local government. This result suggests that, as predicted, the 13 We use parsimonious specifications since the number of observations shrinks rapidly when additional control variables are included. We report the estimated coefficients of the set of control variables that yields the most interesting results.
distribution of fiscal authority to states/provinces provides an institutional setting in which governments are more likely to have a strong commitment to privatization. The government's political orientation also appears to have an effect on residual government voting rights, although the difference is not statistically significant in the model that uses peeradjusted performance measures (Column 4). 14 Overall, the estimated coefficients of the variable Partisan suggest a negative relation between the presence of a rightwing government and the extent of government voting rights. This result is completely consistent with previous findings (Jones et al., 1999 .
Interestingly, the electoral system also has a considerable effect on the control structure of privatized firms. We find a strong and negative relation between the disproportionality index, Dispr, and residual government voting rights. This evidence is consistent with the political economy literature, which continues to find links between electoral rules and a broad range of fiscal policy choices. On average, majority rule countries, which display higher disproportionality between the percentage mix of officials' parties and the percentage mix of the electorate's votes, are associated with smaller governments, less welfare spending and balanced budgets (Milesi Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003) . Our results are consistent with these associations. In our sample, the majority rule governments retain a lower percentage of voting rights in privatized firms than do more proportional governments; this is certainly consistent with smaller government. Majority rule might also make it easier to make the decision to privatize completely, since there are fewer veto players involved in the privatization decision compared to more proportional governments.
The firm's industry does not generally seem to impact the level of residual control.
Surprisingly, government stakes in banks and financial institutions are significantly lower than those in nonfinancial firms. In their analysis of 1995 data, La Porta, LopezdeSilanes, and
Shleifer (2002) find the opposite; they conclude that government ownership of privatized banks 14 It is important to note that the number of observations is substantially lower in the model that uses differences (Column 4).
remained very large even after the wave of privatization in the 1980s. Our finding suggests that after the largewave of the 1990s, government ownership in banks declined considerably relative to other sectors.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table V report the estimated coefficients for firm characteristics.
Interestingly, we find that more valuable and more profitable firms tend to be privatized more completely than other firms. Markettobook (MB) and Return on equity (ROE) have highly statistically significant negative coefficients, both in the model that uses firm levels (Column (3)) and in the one that uses differences between privatized firms and their matched peers (Column (4)). These findings appear consistent with a "bestfootforward" privatization policy, in which governments sell stronger companies first (see Gupta, Ham, Svejnar, 2005) . Finally, in the model based on peer adjusted data, both firm size and the nonpecuniary private benefits associated with control are positively associated with more residual government control. Government debt ratios and firm leverage do not appear to be associated with residual voting rights.
[ Table VI goes here] Table VI presents Second, firms in the utility sector are more likely to have golden shares. This result is not surprising because golden share provisions have been specifically designed by governments to maintain control in politically sensitive sectors. Utilities include electricity, gas, and telecommunications companies, which provide essential public services that are often regulated because of their importance to the nation.
Finally, we estimate the overall residual government control of privatized firms maintained through the combination of voting rights and golden shares. Table VII presents the probit analysis results. The analysis uses two dummy dependent variables that equal 1 when the firm has at least one golden share or when ultimate government voting rights exceed 10 or 20 percent of outstanding rights in company i in year t (GoldOwn10 and GoldOwn20, respectively). These variables reflect governments' unwillingness to completely relinquish control in privatized firms.
[ Table VII goes here]
Three factors which were highly significant in the analysis of State voting rights are also significant here: disproportional representation in the electoral system, fiscal federalism, and industry. Across specifications and control thresholds, we find a negative and highly statistically significant relation between government control and disproportionality of the electoral system. In majority rule systems (disproportional), governments relinquish more control during privatization compared to those in more proportional systems.
Fiscal federalism is again important in explaining residual power in privatized firms. The coefficient on Federal is negative and statistically significant in all eight models, albeit less so for the smaller sample used in the two variations of model [4] , which use differences in the financial variables between privatized and matched firms. Overall these findings suggest that countries in which substantial fiscal authority are delegated to subnational governments have institutions that are favourable for more complete privatization.
Finally, in view of earlier research findings, it is striking that at the end of 2000 firms, firms in the financial industry are likely to be more completely privatized than other firms. The highly statistically significant negative coefficient for the finance sector variable suggests that in developed economies banks are less important in financing politically motivated projects than they used to be. Overall, government control of privatized firms appears to be relatively unaffected by other sector or by individual firm characteristics.
V. Conclusions
Our study yields important new findings concerning government control over firms after privatization. First, results indicate that across our sample of firms from OECD countries, privatization is less complete than it appears at first glance. By combining information on ultimate voting rights, which is a relatively new concept, with data on special powers granted to Our results also indicate that a country's legal and government systems impact the degree to which the government relinquishes control in privatized firms. We show that in common law countries, golden shares are frequently used by governments to retain control after privatization.
The presence of politicians on the boards of privatized companies in common law countries provides additional evidence of government control. On the other hand, in civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, both directly, and indirectly by pyramiding and with dual class shares. Surprisingly, when we ignore which particular mechanism is used, we find no association between a country's legal tradition and the extent of government control over privatized companies. However, overall government control appears to be related to other characteristics of the political system; governments tend to retain more control after privatization in countries with proportional electoral rules and with centralized political authority.
15 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a076sa1.html Figure 1 . Table IV ). Leverage is a firm's debttoequity ratio. MB is the markettobook ratio. ROE is the return on equity. Size is the (log) of total assets. Benefit is a proxy for the nonpecuniary benefits of control. Year Dummies include a set of time dummies for 19962000 (coefficients are not reported). All time varying covariates are lagged one year. In regression (3) firmlevel financial variables are measures for the privatized company, while in regression (4) Table III) is observed in company i in year t. The individual effects are assumed to be normally distributed (randomeffects model). Common Law is a dummy that equals 1 for companies in common law countries. Partisan is a variable capturing the rightleft wing political orientation of the executive branch of government; it ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Dispr is the Gallagher index of electoral disproportionality in a country. If a firm is incorporated in a country in which federal states or provinces have authority over taxation, government spending or regulation, it is categorized as Federal. Debt Ratio is the ratio of total public debt to GDP. Petroleum, Transportation, Utilities, and Finance are sector dummies based on twodigits SIC codes (see Table IV ). Leverage is a firm's debttoequity ratio. MB is the markettobook ratio. ROE is the return on equity. Size is the (log) of total assets. Benefit is a proxy for the nonpecuniary benefits of control. Year Dummies include a set of time dummies for 19962000 (coefficients are not reported). All time varying covariates are lagged one year. In regression (3) firmlevel financial variables are measures for the privatized company, while in regression (4) Goldown10 and Goldown20 are indicator variables that equal 1 when at least one golden share provision is observed or ultimate government voting rights exceed 10 or 20 percent of outstanding rights in company i in year t. The individual effects are assumed to be normally distributed (randomeffects model). Common Law is a dummy that equals 1 for companies in common law countries. Partisan is a variable capturing the rightleft wing political orientation of the executive branch of government; it ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Dispr is the Gallagher index of electoral disproportionality in a country. If a firm is incorporated in a country in which federal states or provinces have authority over taxation, government spending or regulation, it is categorized as Federal. Debt Ratio is the ratio of total public debt to GDP. Petroleum, Transportation, Utilities, and Finance are sector dummies based on twodigits SIC codes (see Table IV ). Leverage is a firm's debttoequity ratio. MB is the markettobook ratio. ROE is the return on equity. Size is the (log) of total assets. Benefit is a proxy for the nonpecuniary benefits of control. Year Dummies include a set of time dummies for 19962000 (coefficients are not reported). All time varying covariates are lagged one year. In regression (3) firmlevel financial variables are measures for the privatized company, while in regression (4) 
